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Kentucky's New Abortion Law:
Searching for the Outer Limits
of Permissible Regulation
INTRODUCTION
The 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade' made
abortion2 one of the most controversial of constitutional issues. 3
States content with century-old abortion laws, 4 as well as states
with more liberal abortion statutes, 5 were suddenly forced to
1410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 The abortion issue is so controversial that even the term itself is subject to attack.
See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 787-89 (7th Cir. 1980) (state statute's definition
of abortion as the use of any instrument, medicine, drug or any other substance or device
to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with intent to cause fetal
death was not void for vagueness); Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 530 F Supp.
1136, 1145 (D.R.I. 1982) (state statute requiring that women be informed of "all medical
risks" associated with "abortion procedure" including "psychological risks to fetus," was
unconstitutionally vague); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F Supp. 1302, 1328-30 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(use of the word "miscarriage" in a state statute defimng "abortion" for purposes of cnm-
ieal penalties rendered that statute unconstitutionally vague). Kentucky's statute states:
"'Abortion' shall mean the use of any means whatsoever to terminate the pregnancy of a
woman known to be pregnant with intent to cause fetal death." KY. REV. STAT. §
311.720(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1983) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. This includes an abortion per-
formed "by a woman upon herself [or] upon the advice of a licensed physician." KRS §
311.760(1) (1983). The Seventh Circuit's upholding of a definition similar to Kentucky's in
Charles v. Carey indicates that the Kentucky statute is constitutional on this point. For
more information on the meaning of "abortion,"'see L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, A
LAWER LOOKS AT ABORTION 13-23 (1982), which points out, "What [abortion] connotes
is probably more important than what is denotes." Id. at 22.
3 Although abortion emerged as a political Issue approximately 25 years ago, L.D.
WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 3, it is only in the years since Roe that it has
grown into an issue "that compels almost everyone to take a stand." J.T. NOONAN, JR., A
PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 1 (1979).
4 The first state abortion statutes appeared in the 1820s and by the middle of that
century most states had some governing regulation on abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
138-39; E.R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS: Roe v. Wade AND ITS AFTER-
MATH 9-12 (1982). While the early laws did not criminalize abortion, changes were later
enacted so that by 1880 abortion was illegal everywhere in America. Id. at 13. This strict
regulation remained relatively unchanged until just before Roe. Id. at 14. For more exten-
sive commentary on abortion laws in early America, see J.C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMER-
ICA. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978).
5 Even before Roe, a few states had begun abortion law reform. L.D. WARDLE &
M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 42-43. This led to more liberal statutes in states such as
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adopt a new national standard. 6 Criticism of the Court's ap-
proach and decision7 could not change Roe's status as law or the
likelihood it would not be overturned.8 But -unlike the contro-
versy and headlines surrounding other Supreme Court actions,
the abortion issue did not fade away;9 opposing factions drew
sides and organized forces. 0 Perhaps the prime accomplishment
of a period when the Court liberalized and expanded civil rights,
Roe also may be viewed as one catalyst in the recent trend to-
ward political conservativism. Reacting to perceived desires of
Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington. Id. at 43. The Supreme Court's decision in
Roe went even further than liberal statutes, invalidating in whole or in part abortion laws
in all 50 states. Id. at 44. For an extensive account of the reform movement, see L. LADER,
ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973).
6 Some commentators believe that Roe standardized abortion law by requiring all
abortion statutes "to conform to the same 'model' of abortion regulation." L.D. WARDLE
& M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 3-4. This is true in the sense that it created a limit
beyond which no state could go but the decision did not dictate total conformity. As this
Note will show, states may impose certain limited restrictions if they desire, but also may
choose to impose no restrictions.
7 One criticism was that the Court had engaged in legislative action rather than
constitutional interpretations. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). But see Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the
Trees, Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973); Tribe, Forward: Toward
a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973). For other
commentary from the period, see Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159.
8 The only way Roe might be superseded would be if the Court overruled itself or
the constitution was amended. Neither is likely, although proposals for a constitutional
amendment have been debated in Congress. See E.R. RUBIN, supra note 4, at 115.
9 Other "landmark controversial" decisions, such as school desegregation and leg-
islative apportionment, while initially controversial, have usually been accepted within a
short period after the ruling. L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 4.
10 The years following Roe saw the rise of both "pro-life" and "pro-choice" factions.
For example, "pro-life" movements have grown into a political force to be reckoned with.
They have organized nationally to support candidates favoring a Human Life Amend-
ment and on the state level to work toward more restrictive abortion access. (This Human
Life Amendment is an effort to avoid the involved process of amending the Constitution
by having Congress simply declare that human life begins at conception. E.R. RUBIN,
supra note 4, at 7.) On the other side, the "pro-choice" movement seeks to preserve in-
creased availability of abortion. See L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 3-7
for more discussion on abortion factions. See also E.R. RUBIN, supra note 4, at 87-113; J.T.
NOONAN, supra note 3, at 33-46. Interestingly, these commentators agree that the Roe
deciston may have been too much too soon for abortion supporters. Coming so swiftly and
completely, it placed the movement on the defensive and caught pro-abortion forces
unprepared to meet attacks from the other side. See, e.g., E.R. RUBIN, supra note 4, at 5.
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the majority, legislatures answered Roe with attempts to cir-
cumvent, narrow or ignore the Court's holding.12 Some commen-
tators tried to exploit the opinion's ambiguities. 13 Such efforts
persist and are not likely, to go away in light of the prevalence of
abortion 14 and the controversy it creates. 15
One advantage to increased litigation of abortion regulations
has been a clarification of issues. Though few, Supreme Court
decisions on abortion after Roe have aided abortion law analysis.
Lower court decisions have worked to create an analytical
framework from these decisions. However, some questions as to
the permissible limits of abortion regulation remain unanswered.
This Note discusses whether Kentucky's latest attempt at
abortion regulation 6 meets or exceeds those limits. Because abor-
1 Stricter abortion control may not always be the will of the majority. However,
since the forces mandating such control are vocal and influential they greatly influence
legislators.
12 "The goal of much of the political activity that followed Roe v. Wade was the ulti-
mate reversal of the decision." E.R. RUBIN, supra note 4, at 115. While some states ac-
quiesced, opponents in other states urged resistance, even if new laws would conflict di-
rectly with Roe. Id. at 125. One reason for such conflicting legislation is that legislators
were often more concerned with pleasing their constituents than with passing constitu-
tional legislation. After all, the courts could always shape the enactments into valid law
and the legislators would be off the hook. Thus, legislative responsibility was often passed
to the judiciary. Id. at 129-30.
13 Arguably, Roe does not grant as much as might first appear. In fact, it can be
viewed as establishing that there is no absolute right to an abortion upon demand. See
Comment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: The Abortion Decisions, 34 ARK. L. REv. 276, 289
(1981). Once this is established, "it is only a matter of subsequent decisions to determine
the parameters of the limitations on the abortion decision." Id. Generalities and ambigu-
ities in Blackmun's opinion are thus susceptible to interpretations inviting new attempts at
abortion regulation. See E.R. RUBIN,supra note4, at 115.
14 Abortion has become the most frequently performed operation in the United
States. L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 8. The number performed each
year now exceeds the population of 16 states. Id. Moreover, the abortion rate has been ns-
ing each year since Roe. Id. at 7.
15 Abortion continues to be an issue of major importance. "In fact, it appears to be
shaping into the most significant civil rights issue of the 1980's-perhaps the most signif-
icant one of the last quarter of the twentieth century." Id. at 6.
16 The regulations referred to are codified at KRS §§ 311.710, .720, .726, .729, .732,
.735, .760, .830, .990 (1983). At this writing, the Kentucky provisions are not in force. Im-
plementation and enforcement have been enjoined by the federal court for the Western
District of Kentucky. Eubanks v. Brown, No. C-82-0360 L(A) (W.D. Ky. July 9, 1982)
(granting temporary restraimng order). Eubanks involves a challenge to the new pro-
visions, but since many of the issues involved also are present in cases pending before the
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tion laws are so controversial, each provision of an abortion regu-
lation is susceptible to challenge. Although a detailed analysis of
every provision of the Kentucky act is beyond the scope of this
Note,'7 an effort will be made to identify potential issues, elim-
inate imagined issues18 and point the reader toward other helpful
commentary 19 Most of the discussion, however, will center on
two of the more controversial requirements-informed consent 2
and spousal notification.2i As a preliminary matter, a few words
on the appropriate standard of review may prove helpful.
United States Supreme Court, the lower court postponed action until the Supreme Court
has made its judgments. This Note will refer to those pending cases in analyzing the Ken-
tucky provisions. There is no doubt that the outcome of the cases before the Supreme
Court will have a great bearing on the validity of Kentucky s law as well as the validity of
laws from other states and the permissible scope of future abortion legislation. In fact, the
Court may be gearing up to take a new look at abortion. This is the opinion of Sarah Wed-
dington, the attorney who successfully argued Roe v. Wade 10 years ago. Louisville
Courier Journal & Times, Oct. 24, 1982, at G8, col. 1. One type of regulation that is not
presently before the Court, however, is spousal notification. See notes 170-210 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the spousal notification issue.
17 The Kentucky abortion statute raises many controversial issues that will not be
discussed here. For example, KRS § 311.726 requires that information be provided to the
woman at least two hours before the abortion. This amounts to a mandatory waiting
period and may raise questions of constitutionality. In Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F Supp. 22
(W.D. Ky. 1980) a previous Kentucky requirement of a 24 hour waiting period was de-
clared unconstitutional. Id. at 25-26. Waiting periods can intrude upon the abortion deci-
sion by making it more difficult to obtain an abortion. For example, rural women might
be forced to make two trips to a faraway city abortion climc or to stay over mght while
awaiting an abortion. See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d at 785-86. Moreover, the wait
may serve no purpose since most women come to an abortion clinic with their minds made
up and do not need time to reflect upon their decision. See Wolfe, 519 F Supp. at 25-26.
Although the cases challenging waiting periods have involved time periods of 24 hours or
longer there is still a possibility that even Kentucky's new two-hour provision could be sus-
pect. Of course, shorter periods will produce less of a burden and should have a greater
chance at constitutionality.
18 "Imagined issues" are those regulations that appear suspect on their faces but
which Supreme Court decisions have held constitutional.
19 By way of beginning this referral process, it should be noted that the Office of the
Attorney General of Kentucky has issued an opimon discussing the constitutionality of the
new law. 82 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 97 (Feb. 18, 1983).
20 KRS §§ 311.726, .729 (1983). See notes 104-69 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of informed consent provisions.
21 KRS § 311.735 (1983). See notes 170-210 infra and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of spousal notification requirements.
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I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The conclusion of the Court's analysis in Roe is not that abor-
tion itself has a protected status, but rather that a woman has a
fundamental right to decide for herself whether to have an abor-
tion.2 It is freedom of choice that is protected. Such a right is not
expressly enumerated in the Constitution but arises from a so-
called "right of privacy," 3 evident more in the spirit of the con-
stitution than in its specifics.24 Placing the abortion decision
within the right of privacy provides it with the highest degree of
protection from state infringement. In other words, a state must
demonstrate a "compelling state interest" in support of any at-
2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. One commentator phrased it well by stating that
Roe "represents less a decision in favor of abortion than a decision in favor of leaving the
matter, however it might come out in particular cases, to women rather than to legislative
majorities." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 (1978).
23 410 U.S. at 153. It must be noted that "the right of privacy discussed in Roe v.
Wade and its progeny is not a right of confidentiality, but a right of free choice (free from
government prohibition or compulsion)." L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2,
at 78. This right of privacy was alluded to as early as 1928 in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (calling "the right to be let alone" the
one "most valued by civilized man"), and first applied in sexually related matters in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating act requiring sterilization of cer-
tamn criminals). See Wingo & Freytag, Decions Within the Family: A Clash of Constitu-
tional Rights, 67 IOWA L. REv. 401, 402-07 (1982); Note, Spousal Notification Require-
ment Is Constitutionally Permissible Burden on Woman's Right to Privacy in Abortion
Dectsion: Schemberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981), 13 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1495,
1496-97 (1982). The concept was clarified m Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (invalidating prohibition on contraceptive use by married couples). Keiter, Pri-
vacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme Court's Ap-
proach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 464 (1982). The right of privacy was defined, and its reach
extended in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right extended beyond marriage to
cover single adults desiring access to contraceptives). These cases, together with similar
Court decisions, "delineate a sphere of interests-which the Court now groups and de-
nominates 'privacy."' Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 7, at 772. See also J. T. NOONAN,
JR.,supra note 3, at 20-21.
2 Various opimons have tied the right to the first amendment, Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); the fifth amendment, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); the
ninth amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring);
the fourteenth amendment, ui. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); and the general penumbra
of the Bill of Rights, id. at 484-85. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152; Comment, The
Maine Abortion Statutes of 1979: Testing the Constitutional Limits, 32 ME. L. REv. 315,
320-21 (1980). The Court in Roe believed the right of privacy to be "founded in the Four-
teenth Amendments concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action." 410
U.S. at 153.
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tempt to interfere in a woman's abortion decision . 5 Moreover,
even if such an interest is present, the means selected to advance
the interest must be the narrowest possible.2
6
In analyzing the right involved in Roe, the Court concluded
that no compelling state interest arose until the end of the first
trimester of pregnancy. Before that time, the abortion decision
should be made "free of interference by the State."2 7 But while
Roe "arguably holds that there are no compelling state interests
that ever justify a state-imposed burden on the right to a first tri-
mester abortion,"28 later Court decisions have "allowed some
state enactments that regulate the first trimester abortion deci-
sion."2 9 This disparity has produced confusion over the standard
of review applicable to attempts to regulate abortion during the
first trimester of pregnancy Two distinct approaches have
emerged. 3°
The first approach has focused on Supreme Court language
indicating that a regulation "is not unconstitutional unless it un-
duly burdens the right to seek an abortion." 3' Courts have picked
up on this language and concluded that "unduly burdens" is a
threshold requirement for applying strict scrutiny.32 In other
25 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. There can be no set definition of "compelling state
interest," just as there is no helpful definition of "reasonableness." It is a test more than a
term. It might be helpful to restate it as a requirement that the state show a "serious need"
for the action in question. See BLACKrS LAw DICTIONARY 256 (5th dd. 1979).
26 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. These two prongs, compelling state interest and the
narrowest means possible, together create a formidable barrier. In fact, precedent shows
"that when courts apply this strict judicial scrutiny to legislative action, they inevitably m-
validate the statute." Keiter, supra note 23, at 465.
27 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. The Roe decision divided abortion analysis into
three stages: the first trimester, during which no interest is compelling; the period from
the end of the first trimester up until fetal viability, during which the state's interest m ma-
ternal health is compelling; and the period from viability until birth, during which there is
a compelling interest in the potential life represented by the fetus. Id. at 163-65. It should
be emphasized that this latter period begins with viability and not the third trimester.
28 Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 530 F Supp. at 1143 n.5.
29 Id. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (states may refuse to pay for the abortion procedure even though this may discour-
age the indigent from having an abortion). See also Planned Parenthood v.'Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976) (states may impose limited informed consent requirements).
'0 530F Supp. at 1143n.5.
31 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976). See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473.
32 See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F Supp.
1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979), a-f'd in part, rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
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words, if a given regulation unduly burdens a woman's right to
an abortion, then it will be tested by strict scrutiny standards. If
it does not so burden the decision, then the rational relationship
test applies. 33
The second approach uses a different perspective.34 Here the
threshold requirement is whether a regulation imposes a "legally
significant impact or consequence" upon the abortion decision.
Courts using this approach also have found support in prior Su-
preme Court language.36 If a regulation imposes more than a de
minimus effect, strict scrutiny applies. But a mere de minimus
interference need only meet the reasonableness or rational rela-
tionship test. 37 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has deter-
mined that this latter approach is the appropriate one, and other
circuits have agreed.3s The basic rationale was laid out in a
Seventh Circuit case, Charles v. Carey,39 which explained that
requiring a plaintiff to show that a regulation is unduly burden-
some "would virtually preclude the application of strict scrutiny
to state interference in the abortion decision." 4 A burden might
be shown, but proving that it was undue "would require the
plaintiff to anticipate-and to rebut-possible reasons for the in-
terference." 41 Requiring the plaintiff to make this initial showing
would provide insufficient protection to the right granted by
Roe. This led the Seventh Circuit to conclude that the term "un-
due burden" actually "defines the ultimate constitutional issue,
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477
F Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979).
33 530 F Supp. at 1143 n.5. The rational relationship test is a less strict inquiry than
the compelling state interest test. Under it, a court will not second guess an enactment if
there was some rational basis for the legislature's decision. Also, the means selected to
carry out the state's goal need not be the narrowest possible.
34 530 F Supp. at 1143 n.5.
-' 651 F.2d at 1204 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81).
36 See 651 F.2d at 1198. For example, the Sixth Circuit discussed Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. at 464, in adopting the second approach. Id. at 1203-04.
37 530 F Supp. at 1143 n.5.
"' 651 F.2d at 1203-04. Accord Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848,
855 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2267 (1982); Planned Parenthood League v.
Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d at 777. See 530 F
Supp. at 1143.
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not merely the threshold requirement for strict scrutiny "42 For
this reason, requiring only a showing of "significant impact" to
achieve strict scrutiny represents the better approach to the di-
lemma.
43
II. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROVISIONS
Turning now to an analysis of the Kentucky statute, several
of the currently less controversial provisions44 will first be dis-
cussed briefly These provisions deal with parental consent, 45 al-
lowance of only "necessary" abortions, 46 hospitalization require-
ments for second trimester abortionS47 and the definition of "vi-
ability." 4
A. Parental Consent
Section 311.732 of the statute requires that in order for an
unemancipated minor to obtain an abortion, she must receive
the consent of her parents or guardian. 49 In Planned Parenthood
42 Id. Accord 651 F.2d at 1204.
43 It must be remembered, however, that the Supreme Court has not yet clarified
this issue. Perhaps in Maher v. Roe the Court was indicating that "lower courts had been
too zealous in trying to 'protect' the right of abortion access." L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q.
WOOD, supra note 2, at 64. As for now, the agreement of the First Circuit in Bellotti, 641
F.2d 1006; Sixth Circuit in Akron, 651 F.2d 1198; Seventh Circuit in Carey, 647 F.2d 777;
and Eighth Circuit in Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848; supports use of this standard.
44 As already noted, all abortion regulations are controversial. Some relatively clear
pronouncements from the Supreme Court, however, make those first discussed less contro-
versial.
45 KlRS § 311.732 (1983).
46 KRS § 311.723 (1983).
47 KRS § 311.760 (1983).
48 KRS § 311.720(8) (1983).
49 KRS § 311.732(1) (1983) provides as follows:
If a pregnant woman is less than eighteen (18) years of age and not emanci-
pated, or if she has been adjudged an incompetent under KRS Chapter 203,
a physician shall not perform an abortion upon her unless he first obtains the
consent of both the pregnant woman and that of her parents, if she is less
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v. Danforth,0 the Supreme Court held that a state cannot impose
a "blanket" parental consent requirement on an unmarried
minor as a condition to an abortion. 51 It further held, however,
that informed consent could be required from the woman who
was to receive the abortion 2 and that not every minor would be
capable of giving an effective consent.5 The Court later used
these ideas in Bellotti v. BairdM to outline a permissible parental
consent requirement. Such a requirement must contain an alter-
native procedure whereby minors could avoid obtaining parental
consent. Moreover, this alternative must allow the woman to
prove either that 1) she is capable of making a mature and in-
formed abortion decision independent of her parents, or 2) even
if she is unable to make such a decision, the abortion would still
be in her best interests. 56 Kentucky's provision essentially mimics
the Court's model in Bellotti. It provides the required alterna-
than eighteen (18), or of her guardian, if she is incompetent except as here-
after provided.
The section also covers incompetents and requires that only the best interests of the child
be considered in deciding whether to grant consent. Id. It also provides for alternatives
when one parent is dead or the parents are divorced. In those cases, consent of the surviv-
ing parent or the one with custody is sufficient. KRS § 311.732(2) (1983). Emergency
abortions are exempted, but the physician is required to contact the parents after the pro-
cedure has been performed. KRS § 311.732(7) (1983).
50 428 U.S. at 52.
51 Id. at 74.
52 Id. at 66-67
5 3 Id. at 75.
'4 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
'Id. at 643.
56 Id. at 643-44. The Court also stated that the procedure for implementing these al-
ternatives must be "completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an ef-
fective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id. at 644. Thus, the parents will not
be involved at all in the first alternative. Id. at 648. Under the second alternative parental
consultation may or may not be used, depending upon the best interests of the minor in
question. Id.
While Bellotti implies parents generally will not be notified of the proceeding,
such protection is questionable after H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), in which the
Court held that states may require parental notification before an abortion can be per-
formed on an unemincipated minor. This certainly would circumvent the anonymity re-
quirements stated in Bellotti.
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tives, 57 assures anonymity and expedition, 58 and compels the ap-
propriate standard for allowing abortion on an immature minor,
i.e., the best interests of the child.59 The Kentucky provision re-
quiring parental consent is thus constitutional.6°
B. Necessary
The United States Supreme Court has said "a pregnant
woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to an abor-
57 KRS § 311.732(3), (4) (1983). These provisions state:
(3) If one or both of the parents or guardians of the pregnant woman
refuse to consent to the performance of an abortion, or if she elects not to
seek the consent of one or both of her parents or guardians, the appropriate
circuit court in the county in which the applicant resides or in which the
abortion is sought shall upon petition or motion, after an appropriate hear-
ing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if the court determines
that the pregnant woman is sufficiently mature or competent to give in-
formed consent to the proposed abortion.
(4) If the court determines that the pregnant woman is not sufficiently
mature or competent to give informed consent or if the pregnant woman
does not claim to be sufficiently mature or competent to give informed con-
sent to the proposed abortion, the court shall determine whether the perfor-
mance of an abortion would be in her best interests. The court shall not de-
cide until after parental consultation in which the court may participate, if
consultation is possible within a.reasonable time and in a reasonable man-
ner, unless the court concludes the pregnant woman's best interests would
not be served by its participation in the consultation. Whether or not there
has been parental consultation, the court shall deny the abortion if it decides
that the pregnant woman's best interests would be served by denial, or shall
authorize a physician to perform the abortion if it concludes that the preg-
nant woman's best interests would be served by authorization.
The proceeding is to be in "the appropriate circuit court in the county in which the appli-
cant resides or in which the abortion is sought." KRS § 311.732(3) (1983).
8s KRS § 311.732(6) (1983).
59 KRS § 311.732(4) (1983). By placing the two alternatives in separate subsections
and avoiding best interest language in the one dealing with proving capacity to give in-
formed consent, the Kentucky statute avoids confusion on the standard. In other words, a
best interests determination is made only if the minor is incapable of giving her own con-
sent. If she is capable of consenting the court is not free to deny the abortion because it be-
lieves that would be in the child's best interest.
60 For more information on the parental consent issue, see Note, Restrictions on the
Abortion Rights of Minors: Bellotti v. Baird, 3 HAnv. WOMEN's L.J. 119 (1980); Note,
Where for Art Thou Danforth: Bellotti v. Baird, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 965 (1980); Note,
Parent, Child, and the Decion to Abort: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Statutory
Proposal in Bellotti v. Baird, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1869 (1979).
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tion on her demand." 6' Still, it was argued in Doe v. Bolton62 that
a limitation allowing only those abortions deemed necessary in a
physician's best clinical judgment created an unconstitutionally
vague standard. 3 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that
such a standard did not present a vagueness problem. 64 Relying
on language from its opinion in United States v. Vuttch,s the
Court stated that deciding when an abortion was "necessary"
was merely a professional judgment that doctors routinely
make,66 and that the judgment could include consideration of all
relevant factors, such as physical, emotional, psychological and
familial conditions .7 Using this interpretation, the Court con-
cluded that a "necessary" standard actually benefitted a preg-
nant woman by mandating consideration of all relevant medical
factors rather than attempting to limit abortion to a few state-de-
fined situations. Based on this ruling, the Kentucky provision, 69
worded identically to the one involved in Doe, is constitutional. 70
C. Second Trimester Hospitalization
Kentucky requires that all abortions after the first trimester
be performed "by a duly licensed physician in a hospital duly li-
censed by the Kentucky health facilities and health services cer-
tificate of need and licensure board." 71 Although the Supreme
Court expressly stated in Roe that such hospitalization require-
ments were an example of permissible state regulation,72 later
61 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
62 410 U.S. at 179.
63 Id. at 191-92. Appellants argued that such a restriction was without objective
standards, subject to diverse interpretation, and, because it did not sufficiently indicate
the conduct covered, would cause doctors to err on the side of caution, restricting abortion
access. Id. at 191.
'4 Id. at 191-92.
6 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971).
66 410 U.S. at 192.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 KRS § 311.723(i)(a) (1983) provides as follows: "No abortion shall be performed
except by a physician after [hie determines that, m his best clinical judgment, the
abortion is necessary."
70 See 82 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 97, at 3.
71 KRS § 311.760(2) (1983).
72 410 U.S. at 163. The Court also indicated that provisions requiring that all abor-
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cases raised doubt about the scope of that statement. The Court's
distinction in Roe between the first and second trimesters of
pregnancy was based upon the safety of the abortion procedure. 73
Evidence in 1973 indicated that, up to the second trimester,
abortion carried less risk to a woman than continuing her preg-
nancy until childbirth.74 Thus, a state cannot legitimately sup-
port restrictions as protections of maternal health if they in fact
act to create greater risk to the woman. 75 Recent lower court
cases have held that advances in abortion technique now render
that procedure safer than childbirth even in the second trimester
of pregnancy 71 This, coupled with findings that hospital policy
often acts to severely limit access to abortion, 77 has led to findings
that the state's interest in maternal health may no longer be com-
pelling near the beginning of the second trimester, and, thus,
hospital requirements for all of that period are unconstitution-
a Although "[t]he rationale of these decisions appears persua-
sive," 79 the Supreme Court has since summarily affirmed a de-
cision upholding the constitutionality of second trimester hos-
tions be done by a licensed physician would be constitutional even during the first trimes-
ter. Id. at 165.
73 Id. at 163.
74 The Court referred to "the now-established medical fact that until the end of
the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth."
Id. See id. at 149.
7" Id. at 149.
76 Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981); Wolfe v.
Stumbo, 419 F Supp. at 22; Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
77 See, e.g., 519 F Supp. at 23. The court in Wolfe stated: "The record contains con-
vincing proof that no hospitals in Kentucky will allow second trimester abortions to be
performed, except for therapeutic reasons, and that abortions which are done for thera-
peutic reasons constitute a very small portion of the total abortions which are being per-
formed." Id.
78 664 F.2d at 687; 419 F Supp. at 22; 488 F Supp. at 181.
79 Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d at 1210.
The Sixth Circuit was referring to the decisions in Margaret S. and the original Ashcroft
decision, Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980),
vacated and remanded, 655 F.2d at 848. The district court in Ashcroft had found that the
second trimester hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional and the Eighth Circuit
remanded for findings on the cost of hospitalized abortions and on whether requiring hos-
pitalization substantially reduced the number of second trimester abortions being per-
formed. 655 F.2d at 856-57 On remand, the district court concluded that the require-
ment was significantly more expensive and resulted in fewer second trimester abortions.
(The findings on remand are unpublished but are set out in the supplement opinion of the
Eighth Circuit. 664 F.2d at 688-89 n.5.) Based on these findings the Eighth Circuit held
the second trimester hospitalization requirement unconstitutional. 664 F.2d at 690.
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pital requirements.80 Based on this decline "to retreat from the
'bright line' drawn by Roe v. Wade,"8' the Sixth Circuit has re-
cently held that such requirements are still permissible. 82 There-
fore, the Kentucky statute is sound on this point. 83
D. The Definition of "Viability"
Roe v. Wade held that in "respect to the State's important
and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is
at viability."' The Roe decision went on to indicate that viability
first occurred when the fetus is "potentially able to live outside
the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." s The Court again
spoke of viability in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,6 first reit-
erating its Roe definition and then stating that it was "not the
proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability,
which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the
gestation period."87 Viability must be left to the judgment of the
attending physician because the point may vary with each preg-
nancy.A8 The Court then upheld the definition in question since,
80 Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F Supp. 894
(N.D. Ind. 1980), affd sub nom. Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. Orr,
451 U.S. 934 (1981). The district court held a second trimester hospitalization requirement
constitutional because of the specific reference to such a requirement in Roe. 496 F Supp.
at 899. See also Wynn v. Scott, 449 F Supp. at 1302. The court in Wolfe v. Stumbo had
disagreed with Gary-Northwest, saying that it was "based upon a misconception" of Roe,
in that it did not consider the Supreme Court's indication that medical knowledge was not
static and new developments might change abortion analysis. 519 F Supp. at 26. This
statement was made before Gary-Northwest was summarily affirmed.
81 651 F.2d at 1210.
82 Id. Accord Simnopoulos v. Virgina, 277 S.E.2d 194 (Va. 1981), prob. jurts. noted,
102 S. Ct. 2265 (1982). Although Gary-Northwest has been criticized, see note 80 supra,
its summary affirmance does carry some weight. Until a clearer Court pronouncement is
issued it will be presumed to be the law. That pronouncement should be forthcoming
soon, since the issue is now before the Supreme Court. Id.
83 For additional information on abortion health and safety regulations, see L.D.
WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 105-24.
84 410 U.S. at 163.
8 Id. at 160. The Court stated that viability usually occurred at about 28 weeks, but
might occur as early as 24 weeks. Id. It also stated that for "viability" to exist there must be
a potential for "meaningful life" and not merely momentary survival. Id. at 163.
8 428 U.S. at 63-65.
87 Id. at64.
gs Id. "Viability" is a flexible term which may shift with advancements in tech-
nology. If such advances occur, the point would be pushed back to earlier stages of preg-
nancy. As noted in the last section, medical advancements also may change the point at
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rather than setting a specific point, it merely defined viability as
"that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child
may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or
artificial life supportive systems.."
8 9
The Court's next discussion of viability occurred in Colautti
v. Franklin." This case, however, dealt not with a viability def-
inition but with a requirement that no abortion be performed if a
fetus is viable "or if there is sufficient reason to believe that the
fetus might be viable." 91 This requirement was declared uncon-
stitutional because it created two distinct points, one of which
had to conflict with the Roe and Danforth holdings. 2 The Court
in Colautti made clear, though, that it was not in any way aban-
doning the viability definition set forth in Roe and Danforth. 93 In
fact, it expressly reaffirmed those decisions and stated that "[v]i-
ability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physi-
cian on the particular facts of the case before him, there is a
reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the
womb, with or without artificial support.-
94
For the most part, Kentucky's definition of viability95 seems
constitutional based upon the above cases.96 The only potential
which the state has an interest in maternal health by making abortion safer than child-
birth even into the second trimester. Thus, technology may produce a narrowing of the
middle ground in abortion analysis.
89 Id. at 63.
90 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
91 Id. at 382.
9 2 Id. at 393. The Court noted the uncertainty over what was meant by "may be vi-
able" as opposed to "viable." It further remarked that the "may be viable" language could
be an attempt to create a new point of total abortion prohibition, a point where there was
only a remote chance of survival. This would conflict with the Court's viability standard.
Id. at 392-93. This question was not resolved, since the Court thought it necessary only to
point out that one of the two terms differed "in some indeterminate way from the defim-
tion of viability as set forth in Roe and in [Danforth]." Id. at 393. Thus the definition was
declared unconstitutional.
93 Id. at 393n.11.
94 Id. at 388.
95 KRS § 311.720(8) (1983). The statute states: "'Viability' shall mean that stage of
human development when the life of the unborn child may be continued by natural or
life-supportive systems outside the womb of the mother." Id.
9 The language is almost a direct copy of the statute upheld in Danforth, except for
the human development term. But see 83 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 97, at 4. The Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that the determination is to be left to the judgment of the attending physi-
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problem concerns reference to viability as a stage of "human de-
velopment" rather than fetal development. Roe v. Wade held
that the term "person," as used in the Constitution, did not in-
clude the unborn; 97 thus, attempts to define an entity before
birth as a "human being" may be unconstitutional. 98 But despite
the problems such definitions may cause in other contexts, mere-
ly referring to viability as a stage of human development should
not render a definition of viability unconstitutional. Although
the Court has declined to speculate as to when life begins, 99 its
opinion in Roe did state that, after the point of viability, the state
has a compelling interest in "potential life."Ic Since the fetus is
capable of living independently of the mother at viability, the
state should be able to define the stage after viability as a stage of
human development.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMED CONSENT
AND SPoUSAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Although the abortion regulations discussed above are cer-
tainly controversial, other provisions are more current matters of
concern. In their persistent attempts to narrow the abortion rule
expressed in Roe, state legislatures continue to push the limits of
permissible regulation. They have seized upon language in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,10 , upholding a very general in-
formed consent requirement, to enact requirements that before
obtaining an abortion, the woman must receive specific and de-
tailed information on the abortion procedure, abortion alterna-
tives and the developmental characteristics of the fetus. 02 States
cian. Id. This was not required in Danforth. Danforth implicitly indicates that unless
some artificial point of "viability" is legislatively defined in the statute, a general defini-
tion, like Kentucky's, will be presumed to leave the final determination to the attending
physician. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64.
"' 410 U.S. at 158.
98 Kentucky attempts to define "human being" as "any member of the species homo
sapiens from fertilization until death." KRS § 311.720(6) (1983). It also defines "fetus" as
a "human being from fertilization until birth." KRS § 311.720(5) (1983).
9 410 U.S. at 159.
1OO Id. at 163.
101 428 U.S. at 65-67.
102 L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 91.
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have also responded to a ruling that spousal consent require-
ments are unconstitutional 103 by enacting less offensive spousal
notification provisions. Both of these restrictions are questionable
and controversial.
A. Informed Consent
Kentucky requires the pregnant woman's informed consent
before an abortion can be performed. 10 This alone causes no
problem, but the statute goes on to set out specific criteria for
"voluntary and informed" consent. 0 5 The rising popularity of
similar requirements in state legislation has generated increased
litigation over the validity of such requirements. One side of this
struggle claims consent requirements 6 merely protect and give
103 428 U.S. at 67-72.
10 KRS § 311.726 (1983). This provision states:
No abortion shall be performed except with the voluntary and informed
consent of the pregnant woman. Consent to an abortion is voluntary and in-
formed only if:
(1) The woman is provided, at some time before the abortion, a copy of
her pregnancy test result, if such test has been employed, by the physi-
cian who is to perform the abortion or his agent;
(2) The physician who is to perform the abortion or his agent shall provide
the woman at least two (2) hours before the abortion:
(a) The name of the physician who will perform the abortion;
(b) The particular medical risks associated with the particular abor-
tion procedure to be employed in the medical judgment of the
physician based on the particular facts of the case before him;
(c) The probable gestational age of the fetus at the time the abortion
is to be performed;
(d) The printed information required by KRS 311.729(1) and (2); [in-
forming her of public and private services available to assist her
with pregnancy and child rearing] and
(e) The fact that the information prescribed by KRS 311.729(3) is
available to her if she wishes to view it; [this information describes
the characteristics of the fetus at various stages and gives informa-
tion on the possibility of fetus survival].
105 Id.
106 It must be remembered that these provisions act only to insure that the woman's
consent is truly voluntary. They should not be confused with parental or spousal consent
provisions which give a third party veto power over the woman's decision. These latter
provisions are unconstitutional. See 428 U.S. at 65-75.
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meaning to the righi to make an independent abortion decisionl7
while the other side argues that the requirements only stand in
the way of free choice. 18 This litigation gives some insight into
the constitutionality of detailed informed consent requirements.
In particular, guidance is provided by the Supreme Court's sum-
mary affirmation of two lower court decisions-Frezman v. Ash-
croft'09 and Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick.10
These two decisions involve "clear cases of permissible and im-
permissible information requirements""' and help anchor an
analysis of informed consent provisions.
The starting point for analysis of consent requirements, how-
ever, must be the Supreme Court's ruling in Danforth. In that
case, the Court upheld a general provision"2 requiring a woman's
prior written consent to any non-emergency termination of preg-
nancy. The statute did not define "informed consent," but the
Court interpreted it to mean "the giving of information to the pa-
tient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences."" 3
The opinion then created an unclear limitation by stating that
giving any more meaning to "informed consent," would threaten
to confine the attending physician in an "undesired and uncom-
fortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession." 1 4 This dec-
laration leaves unclear the constitutionality of more specific stat-
utory definitions of informed consent such as Kentucky's.
To faciliate analysis of the Kentucky statute, its requirements
will be divided into three categories and discussed separately
107 For example, consent requirements may prevent a woman from being "coerced"
into an abortion when, if she were aware of the procedure's full ramifications or knew of
other alternatives, she might choose otherwise. See E.R. RUBIN, supra note 4, at 127; L.D.
WARDLE & M.A.Q. WooD, supra note 2, at 91.
108 The more detailed the requirements become the more significant their impact on
the abortion decision. Detailed accounts of possible consequences and descriptions of fetal
characteristics only serve to frighten and confuse rather than inform.
109 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
H0 401 F Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd in part sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick,
428 U.S. 901 (1976).
1 Planned Parenthood v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1017. The court was confident of this
statement even in the light of its awareness that summary affirmances should not be given
"undue significance." Id.
112 The provision merely required a woman to certify "that her consent is informed
and freely given and is not the result of coercion." 428 U.S. at 65.
113 Id. at 67n.8.
14 Id.
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These divisions are 1) information about the *rocedure, 2) infor-
mation on abortion alternatives and 3) information concerning
facts of fetal development. 115
1. Information About the Procedure
In brief, Kentucky requires that the woman be provided 1) a
copy of her pregnancy test,"11 2) the name of the physician who
will perform the abortion,"7 3) the probable gestational age of
the fetus"8 and 4) the particular medical risks associated with the
procedure to be used. 9 This information may be provided either
by "the physician who is to perform the abortion or his agent."120
Allowing the information to be provided by either the physi-
cian or his or her agent does not create an impermissible "strait-
jacket" on the physician. If only the physician could give the in-
formation, a hindrance to abortion would be created by increas-
ing cost or by creating scheduling problems.' 2' Kentucky's pro-
vision allows the flexibility to train and use counselors, nurses or
other paraprofessionals to provide the required information.1'2
Although requiring the attending physician to give the informa-
tion may be constitutional,1 3 Kentucky has chosen to take no
chances with its regulation.
115 These categories are taken from L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2,
at 92-99.
116 KRS § 311.726(1) (1983).
117 KRS § 311.726(2)(a) (1983).
118 KRS § 311.726(2)(b) (1983).
119 KRS § 311.726(2)(c) (1983).
120 KRS § 311.726(i), (2) (1983).
121 See Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d at 784; Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 530
F Supp. at 1147-49. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d at 864-65;
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d at 1207; Leigh v.
Olson, 497 F Supp. 1340, 1346 (D.N.D. 1980). As stated in Roberts, "A primary compo-
nent of the cost of an abortion is the cost of the doctor's time." 530 F Supp. at 1148. By us-
ing the doctor's time only for those services truly requiring a doctor, abortion clinics can
hold down costs and provide greater access to abortion. Id.
122 Allowing paraprofessionals to provide informed consent information has become
the national trend. 530 F Supp. at 1148.
123 Roe indicates the abortion decision is to be left to the woman in consultation with
her physician. Therefore, requiring the physician to give the information may be constitu-
tional. L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 101-02. In fact, some courts have
upheld this type of requirement. See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d at 869;
Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F Supp. at 550.
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Kentucky's requirement that the woman receive a copy of
the results of her pregnancy test 2 also is constitutionally sound.
Pregnancy test provisions in other states have been struck down
but only where a test was required in every case or where the at-
tending physician was required to perform the test. 125Those reg-
ulations created an impermissible impact by increasing the cost
of an abortion. For example, the cost of a pregnancy test when
one is medically unnecessary 12 6 or the added cost of a duplicate
test when one has already been performed by a referring physi-
cian can produce an unjustifiable burden, especially if the
woman is indigent. Kentucky does not dictate when a test must
be performed. The decision as to when to require a test, or an
extra test, is left to the expert judgment of the physician. The
statute simply requires that the woman be provided with a writ-
ten verification of whether she is pregnant whenever a preg-
nancy test is performed. Rather than presenting an obstacle to a
woman's abortion decision, it merely verifies whether an abor-
tion decision is necessary This constitutes a perfect example of a
permissible informed consent requirement.
Requiring that the woman be told the name of the physician
who is to perform the abortion also is constitutional. It is difficult
to imagine how this would influence the abortion decision signif-
icantly Surely the physicians have no right to conduct a practice
in secret. The requirement does not frighten or confuse the
patient; rather, it promotes informed choice. For example, if a
particular doctor has a poor reputation, the name requirement
would allow a woman to choose another physician. Requiring
that the doctor's name be given will aid rather than hinder the
woman's informed choice.127
The required revelation of gestational age is a more contro-
versial provision. Although this is not a requirement2 that the
124 KRS § 311.726(l) (1983).
12 See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d at 784-85; 530 F Supp. at 1149.
126 530 F Supp. at 1149. For example, testimony in Roberts indicated that preg-
nancy may be confirmed "consistent with good medical practice" on the basis of a fetal
heartbeat. Id.
127 The Seventh Circuit has upheld a physician's name requirement worded exactly
like Kentucky's. Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d at 783.




woman be told specific characteristics of the fetus, it has pro-
duced problems in the courts. However, these problems arise
only where revelation of age is coupled with disclosure of fetal
characteristics.19 Since Danforth permits information about pos-
sible consequences of abortion,13 and since gestational age "has a
direct relationship to the degree of risk associated with an abor-
tion," 31 a requirement that gestational age be revealed is consti-
tutional. "[A]ny prejudicial effect resulting from these kinds of
informational requirements stems from the essence of informed
consent provisions."'132 Full knowledge can be unsettling but is
permissible when truly necessary to assure informed consent.
This requirement may cause some distress to the pregnant
woman, but because it bears on whether consent is valid and in-
formed, it is constitutional in spite of the more difficult decision
it may produce.13
Danforth also indicates that it is constitutionally permissible
to require information about the particular medical risks abor-
tion involves. Similar provisions have encountered difficulty
when they imposed extensive requirements on the physician or
failed to allow the physician to adapt information to the needs of
the particular patient.'1 Kentucky counters this problem by re-
quiring that information on risks be given only "in the medical
judgment of the physician based on the particular facts of the
129 See Charles v Carey, 627 F.2d at 784. Although the gestational age and fetal
characteristic requirements were in separate provisions the court discussed them together.
It felt that such "required reading" was "punitive to the woman and compromising to the
physician's efforts to do what is best for her." Id.
130 428 U.S. at 67 n.8.
131 Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 530 F Supp. at 1150.
132 Id.
133 "The theory behind any informed consent provision is that providing patients
with sufficient information prior to medical procedures promotes patient autonomy by in-
suring that no matter how difficult the decision may be, the decision is the patient's."
L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 92. Arguably, full disclosure will not
cause distress, since "[a] woman who knows what to expect during the procedure will ex-
perience less anxiety." Id. at 93. The Danforth Court recognized this in stating: "The deci-
sion to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and im-
perative that it be made in full knowledge of its nature and consequences." 428 U.S. at 67.
134 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d at 866-68; Leigh v. Olson,
497 F Supp. at 1345; Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F Supp. at 210-11; Wvnn v'. Scott,
449 F Supp. at 1316-17.
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case." Irs A knowledge of the possible risks involved is at the heart
of meaningful informed consent. A regulation requiring this in-
formation to be conveyed is certainly not extraneous or irrelevant
to the abortion procedure. 36 "[it merely provides that the
woman be informed of the risks she will take in submitting to the
specific abortion procedure."' 37 Kentucky's provision is constitu-
tional since it does not require giving general or possible dangers
inherent in the abortion method, nor does it mandate any partic-
ular facts concerning risk. 1r8 Again, knowing the risks involved
will certainly cause some distress, but in the long run should act
to dispel rather than foster anxieties.' 39
2. Abortion Alternatives
"A woman's awareness of all possible solutions to a problem
pregnancy is also critical to her decision-making process."'14 Ken-
tucky requires that certain printed information be distributed to
every pregnant woman seeking an abortion.141 The information is
to be published by the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources
and is to contain information on "public and private agencies
and services available to assist a woman through pregnancy,
upon childbirth and while the child is dependent, including
reputable adoption agencies."' 42 The Supreme Court has never
discussed the validity of this type of requirement. It has, how-
135 KRS § 311.726(2)(b) (1983).
]' The Eighth Circuit characterized a requirement that women be told their paren-
tal rights would be terminated if a live birth resulted as "irrelevant and extraneous to the
medical services being rendered." Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d at 251-52. If a fact has
no connection to the abortion procedure, it cannot be justified as a legitimate component
of informed consent.
137 Wynn v. Scott, 449 F Supp. at 1317
13S The requirement in Wynn v. Scott was declared unconstitutional because it set
out specific dangers that had to be told to the woman. The Court said this was too specific
because every danger might not be present in every case. Id.
139 See note 133supra.
14' L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 95.
41 KRS § 311.726(2)(d) (1983).
142 KRS § 311.729(i) (1983). Subsection (2) is also to be included in the required ma-
terials. KRS § 311.726(2)(d). It requires that materials given to the woman include a state-
ment that there are many agencies willing to assist the woman through childbirth and
afterwards and "strongly urges" that the agencies be contacted before a final decision is
made. KRS § 311.729(2) (1983).
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ever, affirmed the district court's finding in Planned Parenthood
v. Fitzpatrick that such a requirement is constitutional.'1 The
provision discussed in Fitzpatrwk required giving information on
"possible alternatives to abortion, including childbirth and adop-
tion."'44 The district court believed the requirement was justified
given the realities of the abortion process, e.g., specialized climcs
and procedures unfamiliar to the patient and a "reticence that
works to close off ordinary avenues of information."' 45 Other
courts have agreed with the Fitzpatrick decision and upheld sim-
ilar disclosure-of-alternatives requirements. 46 One court has
even allowed a state to express a preference for childbirth over
abortion as long as the preference is expressed in a way that is not
prejudical to the woman's right to freely decide whether to have
the abortion. 47 Some argument might be made that physicians
should not be required to present alternatives such as adoption
which are not medically related and are thus outside a physi-
cian's reasonable expertise. 48 Kentucky has solved this problem
by requiring the physician merely to distribute information
printed by the state. 1
3. Information on Fetal Development
Some statutes mandate that a woman be provided with in-
formation on the physiological and anatomical characteristics of
the fetus before her consent will be deemed "informed." This
143 Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. at 901, af'g sub nom. Planned Parenthood v.
Fitzpatrick, 401 F Supp. at 554.
144 401 F Supp. at 583 (Green, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 587
146 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1020-21; Charles v. Carey,
627 F.2d at 783; Leigh v. Olson, 497 F Supp. at 1346; Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft,
483 F Supp. at 699.
147 Leigh v. Olson, 497 F Supp. at 1346. The court there held that states may ex-
press a "preference for childbirth over adoption and may encourage childbirth." Id. It
must be noted, however, that the Leigh court required a showing of "undue burden" be-
fore finding an abortion regulation unconstitutional. Encouraging childbirth might be un-
constitutional under the tougher standard of "significant impact." See notes 27-43 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the two approaches in reviewing first trimester
regulations.
148 L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 96.
149 See KRS § 311.726(2)(d).
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represents the most controversial element of informed consent re-
quirements. Some provisions require specific information on
fetal appearance, mobility and tactile sensation.1 5 Others re-
quire information on the ability of the fetus to move and swal-
low' 5' or its ability to feel pain. 52 Still others, including Ken-
tucky's, require only general information on the "probable ana-
tomical and physiological characteristics."'5 3 This latter type of
provision does not set out any particular traits that must be dis-
closed.' T All of these types of information are likely to produce
great anxiety in the pregnant woman "who will no doubt con-
tinue to have an abortion anyway "155 Every court that has dealt
with such requirements has declared them to be unconstitution-
al.5156 The requirements serve no medical purpose and produce
only stress, not the meaningful information necessary to valid
consent.'5 Not only do they create a legally significant impact,
but they present a clear obstacle to a woman's decision to termi-
nate pregnancy. Moreover, "most women would not want to
hear such a description just prior to having an abortion and
most physicians would not consider it good medical practice to
provide one."i' s This type of required disclosure goes far beyond
the general definition of informed consent envisioned in Dan-
150 This specific requrement was contained in the statutes struck down in Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d at 1206, and Margaret S.
v. Edwards, 488 F Supp. at 206.
i"i This requirement was part of the statute involved in Wynn v. Scott, 449 F Supp.
at 1332.
152 See Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d at 784.
10 KRS § 311.729(3) (1983) provides:
(3) The materials shall describe the probable anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the fetus at the various gestational ages at which
abortion might be performed, including any relevant information on
the possibility of fetal survival. The materials shall be scientifically ob-
jective and shall not be prejudicial.
15 Id. See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d at 866; Leigh v. Olson, 497 F
Supp. at 1345.
155 L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 96.
156 See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d at 868; Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d at 1207; Planned Parenthood v. Bellotti,
641 F.2d at 1021-23; Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d at 784; Leigh v. Olson, 497 F Supp. at
1345; Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F Supp. at 210-11.
157 See, e.g., 641 F.2d at 1021-23; 497 F Supp. at 1345.
15s 641 F.2d at 1022. See also 655 F.2d at 867
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forth, i.e., "the giving of information to the patient as to just
what would be done and as to its consequences."' 159
Kentucky attempts to shield its provision by requiring that
the woman be informed only that the information is available:
she is not required to take the information.160 Since nothing is
forced on the patient, this provision appears valid. The only
court that has dealt with such a provision, however, found that
it, too, would be unconstitutional. In Women's Medical Center
v. Roberts,161 the statute in question required the physician to
inform the patient that printed material was available concern-
ing alternatives to abortion and probable physiological and ana-
tomical characteristics of the fetus.162 The court first noted that
the information on characteristics was "totally inappropriate"' l
and "an attempt by the State to coerce the woman's decision,
without regard to her physical and mental health, by the use of
information irrelevant to her decision. ' 64 The court then dis-
cussed whether merely requiring that the information be avail-
able is unconstitutional. In holding that it is, the court focused on
the fact that the physician was required to take affirmative
action by informing the patient that the information was avail-
able. 16 Moreover, the court reasoned that doctors would often
feel compelled to evaluate the materials and that women would
most likely decide whether to view the materials based upon this
evaluation.166 The court stated that such "affirmative action by
the doctors realistically risk[ed] sufficient disclosure of the con-
tent of the materials as to 'skew' the woman's choice one way or
the other ,167 It then concluded that the requirement placed an
unconstitutional straitjacket on the physician. 168
1' 428 U.S. at 67n.8.
160 KRS § 311.726(2)(e) (1983). That subsection provides that the patient must be in-
formed of "the fact that the information prescribed by KRS 311.729(3) is available to her
if she wishes to view it." For the text of KRS § 311.729(3), see footnote 153, supra.
'6' 530 F Supp. at 1136.
162 Id. at 1152-53.
163 Id. at 1153.
1'4 Id. at 1153-54.
165 Id. at 1154.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. The court believed that the "state [was] utilizing the doctor-patient relation-
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Based upon this ruling, the Kentucky requirement would
also be unconstitutional. But while the above analysis has merit,
it does not go far enough. Of course, a woman will probably
make her decision as to whether to receive the information based
upon how the doctor presents availability If it is recommended,
she will most likely accept. If it is not advised, she will probably
decline. But the key is that the statute does not demand an eval-
uation either way Nor does it prohibit one.169 The physician can
make evaluations and recommendations based upon the partic-
ular needs and situation of the individual patient. This is the doc-
tor!s ultimate function-to aid the patient in giving informed
consent by providing individual guidance. For this reason, the
Kentucky provision should be constitutional.
Compared to many informed consent provisions, Kentucky's
statute seems relatively tame and safe. It leaves the provision of
most information to the physician's discretion and mandates only
a few intrusions necessary to ensure that consent is truly in-
formed and valid. Although the United States Supreme Court
has not yet spoken regarding statutes creating specific definitions
of "informed consent," the Kentucky provision seems consistent
with the spirit of the Danforth holding and in line with most
lower court decisions.
B. Spousal Notification
Although Roe established that the abortion decision was to
be left solely to the woman involved, free of burdensome state
regulation, it also specifically stated that it was not discussing
any rights that the father might have. 170 This discussion came
later when the Court in Danforth declared spousal consent re-
quirements unconstitutional.' 7 1 The Court recognized that the
abortion decision should be one in which both wife and husband
ship as a spnngboard to advance its own views without a compelling reason for doing so."
Id.
169 In fact, the statute expressly allows the physician to give views on the validity and
importance of the materials. KRS § 311.729(4) (1983).
170 410 U.S. at 165 n.67
171 428 U.S. at 69. The Court stated that since the state did not have the power to
veto abortion, the state could not delegate such a power to the husband. Id.
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concur, but it concluded that, if agreement was not possible, the
ultimate decision must be the woman's, because she is "more di-
rectly and immediately affected by the pregnancy "172 The Court
has not directly spoken, however, concerning the constitution-
ality of spousal notification provisions.
Kentucky now requires the physician or an agent to notify
the spouse before performing an abortion.173 The only test of such
a provision was in Schemberg v. Smith, 174 a case arising in
Florida. The statute in question required the woman to provide
her husband with notice of the proposed abortion and an oppor-
tunity to consult on the proposal. 17 The case began in district
court with the state attempting to justify the requirement as a le-
gitimate furtherance of "the state's interest in promoting the
marital relationship"' 76 and "the husband's interest in the procre-
ative potential of the marriage."'177 The court found the require-
ment unconstitutional for two reasons. First, in regard to pro-
moting the marital relationship, the provision was overinclusive
because it required notice even when the spouse was not the
father of the fetus.178 Second, it was underinclusive in regard to
preserving procreative potential because notice was not required
for other procedures such as hysterectomies and tubal ligations,
"operations which altogether foreclose marital procreative po-
tential."179
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit altered the lower court's deci-
sion. The court's discussion began by combining the two justifi-
cations offered by the state into a single interest, that of "further-
ing the integrity of the state-created and regulated institutions of
marriage and the family "180 The court then discussed the impor-
17
2 Id. at 71.
173 KRS § 311.735(i) (1983). If spousal notification is not "reasonably possible" be-
fore the abortion, then notice must be given, if reasonably possible, within 30 days after
the abortion. Id. Exception is made for medical emergenices and for when a petition for
marriage dissolution has been served. KRS § 311.735(2) (1983).
174 482 F Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979), remanded, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981), orig-
inal holding reinstated afterfurther proceedings, 550 F Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
175 482 F Supp. at 535.
176 Id. at 538.
177 Id. at 539.
178 Id. at 539.
17
9 id.
180 659 F.2d at 484.
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tance of notice and consultation in family matters and concluded
that the issue involved weighing the woman's right to privacy
against the state's interest in ensuring marital integrity 181 Con-
sidering the societal values of each interest, it held that notice to
the spouse was a burden that took "less from a woman's untram-
melled right to secure an abortion than it [added] to the protec-
tion of the integrity and dignity of family life."'' 2 The court be-
lieved that since the state had created marriage as a vehicle for
"legally safeguarded family life,"'' and thus made the marital
partners dependent upon each other for family aspirations, 1' 4 it
could also ensure that one spouse did not secretly frustrate the
other's desire to have children.185
Turning to the findings of the lower court, the Fifth Circuit
disagreed that failure to require notice of other operations affect-
ing procreation made this requirement unconstitutional. 186 It
stated that a "court may not demand that a legislature address
each manner of frustrating a specific state interest when it legis-
lates on one, discreet matter," in this case, aborton.187 On the
issue of overinclusiveness, the court felt that the district court's
findings were inadequate to sustain invalidation. 'l It pointed out
that since there was a legitimate interest in the procreative po-
tential of marriage it was unimportant whether the fetus in ques-
tion was fathered by the spouse.1 9 Rather, the issue would be
"whether the abortion procedure poses a substantial enough risk
of a decrease in fertility to affect detrimentally the procre-
ative potential of a marriage."'190 This issue was remanded to the
district court for further findings.191
On remand the district court made extensive findings of fact
on whether abortion led to reduced fertility 192 After reviewing










191 Id. at 487
192 550 F Supp. at 1116-23.
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all the evidence, the court found "[n]o credible evidence" to
show that abortion increased the risk of infertility 1'3 Thus, the
spousal notification requirement was again held unconstitution-
al. 1
94
The above opinions leave the issue of spousal notification un-
resolved. Although the notification requirement was ultimately
declared unconstitutional, the opinions contain indications that a
more narrowly drawn requirement would be upheld. 95 This in-
terpretation is supported by dicta in Danforth, stating that
spousal consultation would be helpful prior to an abortion. 196 Of
course, pointing out that consultation is advisable does not neces-
sarily mean that requiring spousal notice would be constitution-
al. Support for such a requirement can be found in the Court's
recent decision in H.L. v. Matheson,'197 upholding a parental
notification requirement for "dependent, unmarried, minor"
girls. 9 8 However, the Court's reasoning regarding parental noti-
fication does not apply to spousal notification. In Matheson, the
restriction was justified by the constitutional right of parents to
direct child rearing'9 9 and by the fact that parents might possess
information that could aid the physician-patient consultation. 20
These considerations are not present when a spouse rather than a
parent is involved.
"The principal sociological rationale for requiring con-
sultation with the spouse is to encourage an airing of feelings be-
tween the couple before any irreversible action is taken." 20' The
state hopes to protect the husband's interest, strengthen mar-
... Id. at 1121.
1'4 Id. at 1123.
195 Id. Also, the overall tone of the Fifth Circuit's opinion was definitely favorable to
the legitimacy of spousal notification requirements. See 659 F.2d at 482-87.
116 428 U.S. at 71.
197 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
198 Id.
199 rId. at 410.
200 Id. at 405. For example, parents might be more aware of their minor child's phy-
sical and emotional characteristics than the child.
201 Etzioni, The Husband's Rights in Abortion, TRIAL, Nov. 1976, 56, at 58.
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riages and provide additional support for the woman. 202 But re-
quiring notice ignores the fact that the ultimate decision is the
woman's alone, that forced consultation will weaken a marriage
rather than strengthen it, and that if the woman is unwilling to
inform her spouse without state intervention, it is unlikely their
relationship is one of mutual support, at least not upon the abor-
tion decision. It ignores the realities of potential spouse abuse and
the possibility that the woman's will may be overborne by her
husband's pressure.m Also, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his
dissent in Matheson, the privacy right associated with the family
is to protect individual choice from state intrusion. 14 It is ironic
that the state attempts to use family integrity to justify state man-
dates upon the family. 2 5 Moreover, the reasoning evident in the
Fifth Circuit's Scheinberg opinion is not consistent with "the in-
stitution of marriage as it stands today.- 211 The main purpose of
marriage may no longer be child rearing, and thus the Fifth Cir-
cuit "was straining in finding the state interest in maintaining
marital integrity as compelling." 207 The court never stated that
the husband's procreative interest in the marriage was constitu-
tionally guaranteed; yet this interest was allowed to supersede
the woman's constitutional right of privacy in the abortion deci-
sion.2 8 For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit opinion is constitu-
tionally unsound.
Because it creates an unjustifiable burden upon the abortion
decision, Kentucky's spousal notification requirement is uncon-
202 L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 79. These state interests seem
suspect in the Kentucky statute since Kentucky allows notice to be given in some circum-
stances even after the abortion has taken place. KRS § 311.735(l) (1983). At this point the
action is irreversible and it is too late for any pre-abortion support or discussion. More-
over, after-the-fact notice could weaken the marriage if the husband feels betrayed by the
failure to notify before the abortion.
203 450 U.S. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD,
supra note 2, at 79.
20 450 U.S. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205 Id.
206 Note, supra note 23, at 1511.
207 Id. at 1508.
208 Id. at 1511.
2M9 But see L.D. WARDLE & M.A.Q. WOOD, supra note 2, at 81-83. "The sensible
approach taken by [the Fifth Circuit] is an encouraging, though isolated departure from
the dogmatism of strict scrutiny." Id. at 82. See also Etziom, supra note 200, at 58.
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stitutional. 10 The state should not invade family privacy to pro-
mote the idea of family integrity Of course, the husband has
some interests, especially if the child is his, but the Kentucky stat-
ute ignores reality by not recognizing that notice to the spouse is
not always advisable. Perhaps a more narrowly drawn provision
would be acceptable, but as it now stands, the Kentucky requre-
ment is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky has attempted to conform to the permissible reg-
ulatory framework constructed by Supreme Court and lower
court decisions. For the most part it has been successful. With the
spousal notification provision, however, it has surpassed the per-
missible limits. This regulation not only has a significant impact
upon the abortion decision, but it also produces an obstacle or
burden to abortion obtainment. Moreover, the notification pro-
vision cannot be justified as advancing a compelling state inter-
est. Thus, it is unconstitutional.
Keith Moorman
210 This conclusion agrees with that in 82 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 97, at 4.
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